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If Bayes’ theorem is as elegant and beau-
tiful as mathematicians claim, why can’t
highly paid professionals remember and
use it appropriately in the course of
doing their jobs? If an African gray par-
rot can learn rudimentary maths, why is
it so hard to teach kids to count? Why
do English-speaking parents expect their
children to learn that the uttered word
‘dog’ refers to the biological species
Canis familiaris, whereas the uttered
word ‘bird’ refers to the biological class
Aves? Why do children readily meet
these expectations? In the final chapter
of  The Evolution of Mind, Lawrence
Shapiro suggests that ‘answers to ques-
tions like these – questions that a ma-
ture psychology should pursue – de-
mand that we attend to human
evolutionary history’ (p. 253).
Throughout the previous nine
chapters of the book, leading thinkers
at the boundaries between evolution-
ary thought and cognitive science raise
and address a series of such questions,
attesting that, in Shapiro’s words, ‘not
only does evolutionary theory help the
psychologist to figure out what the
functions of psychological traits are, but
it also is essential for a complete under-
standing of why our psychological traits
have the characteristics that they do’
(p. 253). The authors take a broad com-
parative perspective throughout, tack-
ling phenomena ranging from reason-
ing and mathematical abilities, through
language use and theory of mind, to
play behaviour. The book thus augments
a growing literature dealing with the
evolution of cognitive mechanisms1–3.
What makes this book distinct from
contemporary volumes is its strong em-
phasis on human development. One of
our species’ most striking qualities is the
extended period of dependence that
characterizes our early years. It is dur-
ing this period that the sophisticated
psychological capacities that distinguish
us from other animals emerge, thus it
makes sense for evolutionary psycholo-
gists to attend to developmental re-
search. Consequently, many of the con-
tributors to this book have no time for
the adage ‘never work with children or
animals’, believing that research into
infant numeracy, the deceitful behav-
iour of primates, or, one might add, the
impairments of clinical populations, can
help inform theories of intact adult
human cognition. Indeed, these writers
are urging behavioural researchers to
work with both children and animals –
to use the same methodological tools
to explore what are ostensibly similar
cognitive phenomena, in order that
comparative questions can be answered
germanely.
For example, Marc Hauser and Susan
Carey present the results of preferential-
looking-time studies (used routinely to
assess the cognition of pre-verbal human
infants) that employed populations of
captive and free-ranging rhesus monkeys
as subjects. Their success in exploring
primate numeracy opens up a cornu-
copia of experimental manipulations
that could be performed on both hu-
man infants and non-human primates.
Through this kind of methodological
cross-fertilization, the authors hope to
move beyond anthropomorphic prima-
tology (treating animals like children)
and ‘knee-jerk behaviourism’ (treating
animals like robots) in order to overcome
‘criticism that interspecific differences
are driven by method differences and
interspecific similarities may sometimes
be spurious’ (p. 54).
As one might expect, several unify-
ing conceptual and methodological con-
cerns percolate the book, trickling down
from the largely empirical early chapters
to solidify in the final, more philosophi-
cal ones. Biological conceptual tools,
such as the distinction between homo-
plasy and homology (the resemblance
of traits due either to convergent evo-
lution or common descent, respectively),
or the methodology of systematics (de-
riving evolutionary family trees), jostle
with anthropological and ethological
concerns, such as the difficulties in-
volved in attributing certain cognitive
capacities to species on the basis of their
behaviour (and also, as Sober points out,
on the basis of the behaviour that they
fail to display), or the problems associ-
ated with rigorous study of behavioural
phenotypes, such as play.
Although an evolutionary approach
to cognitive science is clearly worth-
while, the features that distinguish us
from other animals have arisen over too
short a timespan to be readily explained
by changes in our physiology alone. To
account for human behavioural flexi-
bility, the role of cultural change in ad-
dition to and in interaction with genetic
change must be entertained. The lack of
attention to this aspect of human devel-
opment is the greatest weakness of the
book, and perhaps the field it represents,
as it underlies a mistrust of the evolu-
tionary approach to psychology. In the
same way that Haeckel’s maxim that ‘on-
togeny recapitulates phylogeny’ allowed
developmental psychology to fuel a
‘lazy man’s palaeontology’ (Ref. 4, p. 35),
evolutionary theory is seen by some 
as supporting a lazy man’s social sci-
ence, muddying genuine research with 
damaging evolutionary speculation.
The material presented in The
Evolution of Mind remains valid and
groundbreaking, and should be read
by any developmental or cognitive sci-
entists keen to keep abreast of the grow-
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to their research. However, until theo-
retical and empirical approaches to the
interaction between culture and evolu-
tion (for example, Ref. 5) can be shown
to be sound and made to bear fruit, the
comparative approach epitomized here
will leave some psychologists feeling
short changed, and important chunks
of human psychology in the dark.
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